…slash private debt by 100pc of GDP,
boost growth, stabilize prices, and dethrone bankers all at the same
time. It could be done cleanly and painlessly, by legislative command,
far more quickly than anybody imagined.
The conjuring trick is to replace our
system of private bank-created money — roughly 97pc of the money supply —
with state-created money.
The nation regains sovereign control over the money supply. There are no more banks runs, and fewer boom-bust credit cycles.
It should be pointed out immediately that this idea was co-developed by a man who famously claimed shortly before the stock market crash which ushered in the Great Depression that the market had reached a “permanently high plateau.” Irving Fisher, whom Milton Friedman once called “the greatest economist the United States has ever produced,” was an advocate of supreme government regulation including mandated eugenics to preserve the Nordic race so it would not “vanish or lose its dominance.”
Fisher developed the Chicago Plan during the Depression because of the wide wealth disparity he witnessed. Too many creditors were becoming wealthy on the backs of debtors, or so he alleged. Putting money creation fully into the state’s hands was seen as a counterbalancing maneuver.
Rather than the creditor class being the beneficiaries, the debtor class receives special treatment. The Chicago Plan was a pure populist ploy based on appeasing those who took on too much debt. It is reasoned that a greenbacker monetary system would ease social tension. In actuality, it would instill a kind of recklessness by taking from one class and bailing out another. One side (the debtors) wins in the short run while the other (the creditors) loses. But in the end, both lose and the state is the winner since it holds a monopoly on the supply of money that is ultimately maintained through the threat of violence.
Under the Chicago Plan, Evans-Pritchard refers to money becoming an “equity of the commonwealth” but this is simply linguistic nonsense commonly employed for justifying state usurpations of power. What would back this equity is the ever-present threat of looting by state authorities; no tangible wealth creation. It amounts to voluntary consent overthrown by the trigger of guns and the prospect of prison bars.
Evans-Pritchard, who is no fan of gold, also takes the chance to point out that contrary to popular belief, money did not first develop “as a commodity-based or gold-linked means of exchange” and that “social fiat currencies began with the dawn of time.” He is likely referencing recent work done by anthropologist and anarchist David Graeber which shows that ancient cultures used elaborate systems of credit before the development of money. Graeber’s position is based off of a lack of empirical evidence of the use of money and the documentation of credit systems which used monetary accounting. In other words, money predated barter; not the other way around.
But as Rothbardian economist Robert Murphy points out, Graeber’s claim doesn’t hold up logically since the prices used to formulate a system of credit must have been based off of preceding barter. For example, Joe couldn’t have owed Smith one chicken if chickens weren’t seen as marketable commodities enough where Joe agreed to the transaction. In order to sustain a system of credit with monetary prices, those prices had to be first established by some means. Graeber’s, along with Evans-Pritchard’s, position appears to be that the authorities established these prices without ever witnessing barter taking place. While that could certainly be true, it makes much more sense to deduct that barter took place first so as to give the central planners an idea of what unit should be used for monetary accounting.
What isn’t said but is definitely implied is that the state is the most trustworthy and capable of institution of having complete authority over the money supply in a given society. This is an incredibly dangerous recommendation however.
Money is the lifeblood of any economy. Giving full control over to the state is the equivalent of handing over firecrackers to teenage boys. The number one job of a politician is to be reelected. The number one job of a bureaucrat is to maintain their position while accumulating more jurisdiction and therefore prestige. It is in both their interest to use a fiat currency system totally under their control to enrich those who keep them in office. In all likelihood, such an arrangement would lead to high inflation or even hyperinflation. The very least it would do is cause massive distortions in the capital structure of the economy as resources are dedicated to political endeavors instead of investments to meet consumer demand.
Whenever the state has its hands all over something, the results are the same: inefficiency, waste of resources, and cronyism. Most importantly, the state monopoly over currency means that individuals not within the government are violently restrained from creating their own money. It is an assault on basic liberty and the right of self-ownership.
None of this is to say that the current fractional reserve banking system is legitimate either. Efforts to impose a 100% reserve system are laudable as they would ensure that the right of contract is upheld. Under any understanding of proper law, fractional reserve banking constitutes fraud. When bank deposits are created ex nihilo without any backing, duplicate claims are created on those reserves which a bank actually collects from depositors. In other words, two or more people have a claim on the deposit of someone else. The bank can’t fulfill all of its contracts to everyone who has a claim on the money it supposedly holds; hence where fraud comes in.
Just as murder, rape, and theft are still considered crimes under capitalism, the unfettered marketplace does not give way for fraud to be committed. As economist Jörg Guido Hülsmann writes
There is no tenable economic, legal,
moral, or spiritual rationale that could be adduced in justification of
paper money and fractional-reserve banking. The prevailing ways of money
production, relying as they do on a panoply of legal privileges, are
alien elements in the capitalist [i.e., true free market] economy. They
provide illicit incomes, encourage irresponsibility and dependence,
stimulate the artificial centralization of political and economic
decision-making, and constantly create fundamental disequilibria that
threaten the life and welfare of millions of people. In short, paper
money and fractional-reserve banking go a long way toward accounting for
the excesses for which the capitalist economy is widely chided.

Their version of history will need to be addressed.
ReplyDeleteThe United States monetary experience provides similar lessons to that of the United Kingdom. Colonial paper monies issued by individual states were of the greatest economic advantage to the country (Franklin (1729)), and English suppression of such monies was one of the major reasons for the revolution (Del Mar (1895)). The Continental Currency issued during the revolutionary war was crucial for allowing the Continental Congress to finance the war effort. There was no over-issuance by the colonies, and the only reason why inflation eventually took hold was massive British counterfeiting (Franklin (1786), Schuckers (1874)). The government also managed the issuance of paper monies in the periods 1812-1817 and 1837-1857 conservatively and responsibly (Zarlenga (2002)). The Greenbacks issued by Lincoln during the Civil War were again a crucial tool for financing the war effort, and as documented by Randall (1937) and Studenski and Kroos (1952) their issuance was responsibly managed, resulting in comparatively less inflation than the financing of the war effort in World War I.
Finally, the Aldrich-Vreeland system of the 1907-1913 period, where money issuance was government controlled through the Comptroller of the Currency, was also very effectively administered (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), p. 150). The one blemish on the record of government money issuance was deflationary rather than inflationary in nature. The van Buren presidency triggered the 1837 depression by insisting that the government issuance of money had a 100% gold/silver backing. This completely unnecessary straitjacket meant that the money supply was inadequate for a growing economy. As for the U.S. experience with private money issuance, the record was much worse. Private banks and the privately-owned First and especially Second Bank of the United States repeatedly triggered disastrous business cycles due to initial monetary over-expansion accompanied by high debt levels, followed by monetary contraction and debt deflation, with bankers eventually collecting the collateral of defaulting debtors, thereby contributing to an increasing concentration of wealth. Massive losses were also caused by spurious private bank note issuance in the 1810-1820 period, and similar experiences continued throughout the century (Gouge (1833), Knox (1903)). The large expansion of private credit in the period leading up to the Great Depression was another example of a bank-induced boom-bust cycle, although its severity was exacerbated by mistakes of the Federal Reserve (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)).
Nice, where is that from Bob?
DeletePage 15 of the evil "working paper" by Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof. I expect the MMTers to jump on this proposal with glee. I just skimmed the paper but it clearly omits the essential Austrian concepts of FRB and economic calculation while attempting to undermine the End the Fed movement. Just more intellectual dishonesty.
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